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Abstract
Humans exhibit much more sharing of food harvested by prime-
age hunter-gatherers with dependents relative to such sharing by
lower-order primates. We investigate this behavior in a model in
which a father provides generously to his dependent child-son in
period t in the hope that this gesture will inspire his son to recip-
rocate in the next period when the father is in "retirement". In
our formulation fathers provide better when (a) they are smarter
hunters (b) they have a higher probability of living to experience
a "retirement" and (c) when they are more con￿dent that their
child-sons will indeed provide generously for them in their "retire-
ment". Better food provision by prime-age fathers is associated
with brain-size expansion in our model.
￿ key words: reciprocity, encephalization, intertemporal divi-
sion of labor
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1 Introduction
Kaplan et. al. [2000] point out that contemporary male hunter-gatherers,
as mature, young adults, produce much excess food (energy) relative to
their personal needs compared with lesser primates such as apes and
chimpanzees. These prime-age human males thus support many depen-
dents with their hunting and gathering activity. This striking schedule
of excess energy production inspires us to develop a theory of rational
1decision-making by an adult prime-age hunter which yields this excess
energy production. Our premise is that the support by a father of his
dependents, including his young sons, represents a signal to the sons
to provide generously to their dependents, those of the sons, when the
latter have matured to become prime-age male hunters. One of a son￿ s
dependents will be his now elderly, "retired" father, assuming the latter
has survived into old age. A father then rationally tats in a forward-
planning way in the current period in the hope of receiving a tit (a
generous food alotment) from his son in a later period. Food provision
by the father constitutes a teaching and commitment mechanism that
the father hopes will lead to the son, when grown up, to provide gener-
ously to his dependents, including this "aged" father. We then exploit
this theory to make inferences about routes to brain-size expansion ex-
perienced by early humans some two million years ago.1 Our approach
contrasts with the view that human fathers have evolved to provide for
the energy needs of dependents via a hard-wired, genetically determined
mechanism as with some birds and other lower order creatures. We have
no special evidence for the superiority of our approach but we pursue
it as an exercise. We feel that the evidence for the innate, hard-wired
approach is not clear either. The large and important question remains:
how much parental support of dependents by humans is genetically based
rather than learned or reasoned out.
1Robson and Kaplan [2003] confront the data on excess energy production by
prime-age male humans and solve for a life expectancy function that results in zero net
energy surplus over all cohorts (producers and dependents) at each instant of time.
They treat the providing-for by prime-age males as genetically based rather than
behaviorally based. "That is, in exchange for a subsidy while young, the individual
makes repayments while older. What compels older individuals to repay the loan they
are given while young? The answer is that individuals have a biological motive to
foster their own o⁄spring. Indeed, natural selection would act on genes in￿ uencing
resource transfers between generations. Genes maximizing their representation in
future generations would be those generating such parental concern. The social food-
sharing arrangements of hunter-gatherer societies smooth out this intergenerational
transfer and are presumably Pareto improving, but they do not change its basically
sel￿sh nature." (pp. 156-57, Robson and Kaplan).
2The "generosity" of food sharing with dependents by humans sug-
gests strongly that this behavior is linked to the evolved largeness of the
brains of modern humans relative to lower primates. Largeness here is
associated with a high degree of sociality (a relatively large neocortex)
rather than narrowly de￿ned intelligence that could be associated with
say superior hunting ability. Robson and Kaplan [2003] link the large
volume of sharing by evolved humans relative to lower primates to an
evolved high cognitive capacity in humans for hunting and gathering,
relative to apes and chimpanzees, and to an evolved genetic endowment
that makes humans especially caring parents. We depart from Robson
and Kaplan by placing the food providing-for by a father-hunter into a
choice-theoretic framework. Our prime-age male hunters provide meat
for dependents in order to attempt to induce son-dependents to provide
for the fathers when the latter is in "retirement" and is unable to pro-
vide for himself. The extent of providing-for by a father depends on the
hunting ability of a father in our model, on the uncertainty the father
faces of having a son who provides poorly when the father is in "retire-
ment", and on the uncertainty that the father faces of simply not living
to experience a "retirement". The perturbing of a parameter linked to
each of these three dimensions results in more generous provision of meat
for dependents by the father and in our view to brain-size increase by
the children who are better provided for.2 Our model is then compatible
with at least three fairly distinct theories of brain-size expansion take-o⁄
in the history of primates.
Fathers in our model must reason out that they should signal to their
child-sons by their behavior in order to try to get the sons to "co-operate"
at a later stage. Fathers must plan and also must see the possibility of
2We link more food provision for a child-dependent over a series of generations
to brain-size expansion alone. An alternate formulation would have expanded food
provision from a father lead to expanded fertility by females and/or to greater life
expectancy by those getting the larger food alotments.
3titting taking place later in return for a tat. Dunbar [1992] has argued
that the large ratio of the human neocortex to overall brain size3 in-
dicates an extra capacity of humans for non-violent social interaction.
In this view the distinguishing feature of humans is the extra capacity,
above that of other primates, for social interactions, a capacity make
possible by the relatively large neocortex. The complexity of mating be-
havior is one important aspect of social behavior (e.g. Schillaci [2008]).
Dunbar suggested that one could actually quantify this capacity for ex-
tra sociality in humans by measuring the relative sizes of social groups
that di⁄erent primates have evolved to live within. Dunbar argued for
150 individuals for humans with their large neocortex and many fewer
for lower-order primates. Grooming a fellow primate is central to peace-
ful gesturing, to non-kin based sociality, in the wild. Keeping track of
whom to groom￿ and why￿ demands considerable mental accounting.
The groomer needs to remember who is allied with whom, hostile to
whom, or lusts after whom, and conduct grooming accordingly. Dunbar
has argued that while lower primates use grooming of one￿ s fellows as
a bonding activity, humans evolved language to conduct their particu-
lar exercises in social bonding. Language capacity is of course seated
in the neocortex of humans. The links between social interaction and
brain area activation in humans has been closely studied in recent years.
Imaging of the brain with fMRI has become fairly common. Recently,
researchers have been able to study areas of brain activation in humans
for such phenomena as punishment activity in the face of unfair actions
of a fellow (reviewed by Fehr [2009]). Speci￿c areas of the neocortex
(bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and bilateral anterior
insula (AI)) were observed to become active in these experiments.
A fairly standard theory of brain-size expansion take-o⁄ has forest-
3With a neocortex volume of 1006.5 cc and a total brain volume of 1251.8 cc, the
neocortex ratio for humans is CR=4.1. This is about 50% larger than the maximum
value for any other primate species (see Dunbar 1992).
4acclimatized primates ￿nding themselves fairly suddenly living in an
open savannah environment some two million years ago. The new envi-
ronment appeared because of an exogenous climate shift. The forest-
acclimatized primates ￿ ourished in the new savannah environmental
niche in part because tubers and game were plentiful. They became
largely bipedal and e⁄ective at running. Their forelimbs were freed up
for pursuing new tasks and their brain-size expanded. Ultimately they
became e⁄ective game hunters and developed diets with regular meat
portions, diets that could support relatively large and energy-extensive
brains. Robson and Kaplan (p. 152) note that 65% of energy consump-
tion by a human infant is directed to brain maintenance and expansion.
Though the human brain is about 3% of an adult￿ s body weight, the
energy requirements of brain maintenance take up about 20% of energy
in￿ ow4 (Wade [2006; p. 19]). It seems generally accepted that for early
humans to experience notable brain-size expansion, they needed a diet
that included regular portions of meat. And a regular meat diet would
have worked best with cooking and cooking necessitated the controlled
use of ￿re. Remnants of the "camp￿res" of early humans are very scarce
and the dating of the controlled use of ￿re by early humans remains
controversial.5 A way to capture this ￿ ourishing of early humans in
the new savannah environment formally is to have a parameter, rep-
resenting hunting e⁄ectiveness, shift. Humans ￿ ourished because skills
4Homo habilis had brain volumes of 600 to 800 cubic centimeters, The australop-
ithecine lived with a volume of four to ￿ve hundred cubic centimeters. Chimps have
brain volumes of about 400 cubic centimeters, while modern humans register at about
1400 cubic centimeters. Researchers face the problem that neanderthals had larger
brains than do modern humans and so prefer to measure prospective brain capacities
with the ratio of brain volume to body volume (the encephalization quotient, EQ).
Chimps have an EQ of 2, australopithecines of 2.5, homo habilis of 3.1, home ergaster
of 3.3 and modern humans of 5.8. (Wade, 2006; p. 18).
5Richard Wrangham has been suggesting that the cooking of food by early humans
was the key event in triggering brain-size expansion. See Wrangham [2009]. Frances
Barton [2009] argues that the sitting around a camp￿re decreased the melatonin
levels of early humans and this accelerated key genetic changes that allowed humans
to evolve relatively rapidly.
5accumulated over millenia suddenly became particularly productive. We
consider such a parameter shift in our model. Such a shift was central to
the analysis of "excess" food provision by adult hunters of Robson and
Kaplan [2003] as well.
However, we wish to focus more on the contribution of enhanced
sociality (a larger neocortex) to brain size expansion. For example, if
inter-clan warfare were less in the savannah, the father could be more
assured of experiencing a "retirement" and this in our model induces the
prime-age father to provide more generously for his dependents. Thirdly,
we contemplate a shift that increases the trust of the father of the quality
of support which his son will provide to him in "retirement". Less uncer-
tainty facing the father of future support induces the father, as prime-age
hunter, to provide more generously to his dependents in our framework.
The more generous support a dependent receives translates in our frame-
work to a force for brain-size expansion in the child-dependents. We
contend then that larger brains support both enhanced cognitive capac-
ities as well as enhanced capacity for productive social interaction as in
team-work in hunting activity. A key dimension of enhanced sociality in
general6 in our view is the improvement in the trust that a father has in
the likelihood that his son will reciprocate with support for the father
in the latter￿ s "retirement".
Matters could of course be more complicated. Consider the case of
the brain of an early human having parts specialized in two activities:
6Wade argues for two large forces selecting for increased sociality. (1) Access of
males to females was democratized. Dominant males no longer monopolized access
to females for mating. Some 1.7 million years ago there emerged ergaster with a
brain size of about 800 cubic centimeters. The males and females were closer in size
than in previous proto-humans. "This is a hint of some important change in social
structure, very possibly a switch from the separate male and female hierarchies of
chimp communities to the male-female bond that characterizes human societies."
(Wade, p.11) (2) "... a steady increase in brain size ￿probably evolved in response
to the most critical aspect of the environment, the society in which an individual
lived. Judging whom to trust, forming alliances, keeping score of favors given and
received ￿all were necessities made easier by greater cognitive ability." (p. 7).
6hunting skill and team-play skill. Suppose when our ape-like ancestors
were "re-located" to the savannah, their existing team-player capacities
became suddenly very productive in hunting activity. Better harvests
then would have led to better fed children and to brain-size increase.
These larger brains may well have possessed an enhanced capacity for
hunting or tool-using per se. There could have been important com-
plementarities in operation. Our point is that the savannah could well
have triggered brain-size expansion via routes involving sociality (indi-
viduals functioning well in teams) rather than more narrowly de￿ned
cognitive capacity. The record indicates that the body sizes of early
human males and females moved closer together some 1.7 million years
ago.7 (Wade [2006], p.21). Brain-size expansion could have involved a
subtle see-saw path with sociality capacities leading at times and gener-
alized tool-making capacities leading at other times. Expansion of brain
areas that support say team-play could well have yielded an increased ca-
pacity for tool-making and problem-solving. Here we connect brain-size
expansion to a utility-maximizing, two period model of hunting activity
by a father, activity which has a large in￿ uence on his level of support
7The reduction in the size of males relative to females some 1.7 million years back
co-incided with females evolving with a smaller pelvis. This suggests that babies
would have been less mature at birth and mothers with baby in arms would have
been vulnerable to attacks. A male partner must, judging ex post, have had an
interest in protecting the mother and infant if he were to be successful in passing
along his genes. (Only the genes of the successful procreators and next generation
successful procreators, etc. do in fact get passed on.) About 1.7 million years back
then, pair-bonding or mating "competition" appears to have taken a new turn. Not
only would fathers need to provide protection for their mates and infants but they
may well have had to provide meat for mother and children as well. Wade (p. 7) puts
the evolution of pair-bonding as follows. "The apes ancestral to both chimpanzees
and humans probably lived as small bands of related individuals who defended a
home territory, often with lethal attacks against neighbors. They had separate male
and female hierarchies and most infants were sired by the society￿ s dominant male or
his allies. The emergence of the human line was also territorial but in time developed
a new social structure based on pair bonding, a stable relationship between a male
and one or more females. This critical shift would have given all males a chance
of reproduction and hence a stronger interest in the group￿ s welfare, making human
societies larger and more cohesive." Or, family sociality, form this perspective, was
a necessary pre-condition for clan sociality.
7he anticipates that he will receive in his "reitirement".
Roughly speaking, we are pursuing a notion of division of labor and
trade across periods rather than across space. Fathers supply food to
child-sons when the father has a special capacity for food-harvesting
and sons reciprocate when they have grown to possess the special food-
harvesting capacity. This is a more complicated form of trade than that
which occurs at a point in time (A gives B some widgets in return for
some yams from B (trade across space at a point in time)). Elsewhere
I noted (Hartwick [2008]) that this ordinary division of labor and in-
terpersonal trade itself requires the development of certain capacities
for "fairness" or sociality. Participants must leave a "transaction" not
aggrieved by the terms of trade. Here we take up the matter of the capac-
ity for sociality needed for a certain type of intertemporal, interpersonal
trade.
2 A Model
Consider a male in a primitive villages who has three phases each of
about eighteen years to his life: dependency, prime-age hunting and
"retirement". As a dependent he receives a food alotment determined
by his parents. He does no choosing in this dependency phase but he
does become aware of generous or not-so-generous provision by his father
compared with the providing-for activities of other fathers. During the
second phase he supplies the energy needs of himself and a large group of
dependents (his mate and children and say two surviving grandparents).
During his "retirement" phase, he provides childcare and instruction for
children8 and one of his male children provides food for an extended
8Hrdy￿ s [2009] view is that there is no de￿ned ￿ maternal instinct￿ , as it depends on
a number of variables, and is therefore not innate, as once thought. She also stands
by her view that humans evolved as cooperative breeders, making them essentially
unable to raise o⁄spring without a helper. This is where the concept of allomothering
comes in - relatives other than the mother, such as the father, grandparents, and older
siblings, as well as genetically unrelated helpers, such as nannies, nurses, and child
care groups, who spend time with an infant, leaving the mother with more free time
8family, including our hunter, now in "retirement". Our young adult
hunter￿ s lifetime utility has two adult phases: a productive prime-age
hunting phase say from age eighteen to thirty-six and a "retirement"






U(CY;T ￿ H) is the utility a productive young, adult hunter gets over
this "productive" phase of his life. CY is own consumption of energy, say
meat, and T ￿H is own consumption of leisure. H is hours hunting and
T is total hours available. f￿U(￿0CE;T ￿ B(￿0)) + (1 ￿ ￿)U(￿CE;T ￿
B(￿))g is the expected utility of this same hunter, viewed from his prime-
age hunting stage, in his "retirement". When he reaches "retirement"
he anticipates getting either consumption bundle [￿0CE;T ￿B(￿0)] with
probability ￿ or [￿CE;T ￿ B(￿)] with probability (1 ￿ ￿): ￿0CE is own
consumption of meat in the "￿ state" (CE = [￿H ￿ CY]=￿) and ￿CE
is own consumption of meat in the "(1 ￿ ￿) state". ￿ is the number of
dependents, treated as exogenous, that the father will share aggregate
"donations" with when in "retirement". T ￿ B(￿0) is leisure in the ￿
state and T ￿ B(￿) is leisure in the (1 ￿ ￿) state. We will view B(￿0)
and B(￿) as hours of childcare and instruction provided by the male
hunter, now in "retirement". More hours are provided by the father in
retirement when the son provides a large alotment, ￿0CE to the father,
now in retirement.
We assume a form of rational expectations: we assume that the ex-
pected support in "retirement", provided now by a son, equals the sup-
port the father provided earlier to his son and other dependents. That
is, we assume that ￿￿0 +(1￿￿)￿ = 1: In addition, for concreteness, we
assume that ￿0 > ￿: This implies that 1
￿ > ￿0 > 1 and 1 > ￿ > 0:
to meet her own needs.
9￿ is the e¢ ciency of an hour of hunting e⁄ort. Then [￿H ￿CY]=￿ is
the per dependent provision that the father chose to provide when he was
a young, adult hunter. The father faces uncertainty about the amount
of support that his son will provide for him in "retirement" when he, the
father, is engaged in supporting his dependents. The father commits to
a level of support of his dependents while being uncertain about what
level of support that his son will provide for him, the father, when he
moves into "retirement". The retired father becomes is one of the ￿
dependents in the father￿ s ￿nal phase of life.
￿ is a life expectancy parameter lying between 0 and unity. It cap-
tures the probability that a young, active hunter will in fact survive
to enjoy a "retirement". Since we assume for concreteness that two
grandparents are supported as dependents, among ￿ve in total, it is
appropriate to assume that ￿ = 1
2: Thus the father faces a probability
of 1=2 for enjoying a "retirement" of an unvarying duration, say eigh-
teen years. For a perfectly co-ordinated over-lapping structure, we can
postulate a period of childhood dependency of eighteen years, of adult,
productive hunting activity of eighteen years and of expected retirement
of eighteen years. Robson and Kaplan (p. 154) indicate that contempo-
rary hunter-gatherers face steeply rising mortality probabilities at about
age sixty-￿ve. Hence life-expectancy can be quite good for people in
primitive cultures if they make it through childhood.
Central of the level of sociality in this model is the possibility of a
reduction in risk incurred by the father, risk associated with the level of
support that his son will provide to him in his "retirement". Of course,
we are only dealing here with intra-familty sociality, but it seems reason-
able to infer that this is the domain where sociality ￿rst gets rooted and
is then transferred by various mechanisms to social dynamics beyond the
familty. We recapitulate. In our model, fathers supply food (meat or
energy) to their dependents and the per person allocation is the same in
10expected value as that supplied by the sons to their dependents, includ-
ing the aged fathers, now in "retirement". More sociality involves, via
signalling to sons, larger allocations of meat by fathers to dependents.
In addition to ￿￿0CE + (1 ￿ ￿)￿CE being expected consumption, when
elderly, we have ￿B(￿0)+(1￿￿)B(1￿￿0) as the elderly father￿ s expected
time commitment to the family as for example in childcare activity and
in instructing children in say hunting activity. We assume that B is in-
creasing in ￿0 and thus that leisure in old age for a father "in retirement"
is T ￿ B(￿0): This seems to be an uncontroversial assumption. More
sociality within the family leads to more childcare activity by the grand-
father, while the latter is in "retirement". Less clear is what assumption
should be made about the response of the grandfather￿ s childcare activ-
ity in the "bad" state. We have formulated it as B(1￿￿0) declining with
￿0 increasing. Hence an increase in sociality within the family leads to
more childcare activity in the "good" state but at the same time, less
childcare activity in the bad state. How leisure time is organized by
the grandfather in his "retirement" is crucial in our model as to how a
drift up in sociality (￿0 increases) a⁄ects the welfare of dependents (via
changes in ￿H ￿ CY). For example, if we formulated time devoted to
childcare in "retirement" as strongly increasing in ￿0; this would imply
"strongly" less leisure for a grandfather in "retirement" when ￿0 drifted
up. With "strong" complementarity between consumption of meat and
leisure in "retirement", this could yield a smaller alotment of meat to
the dependents, including the grandfather in the "retirement" phase.
Such an outcome would indeed be counter-intuitive since we would be
dealing with a case of increased sociality within the family and a reduced
alotment of meat to each dependent. Below in our calculations we have
B(￿0) increase "gently" with ￿0:
113 Solving the Model
For ￿ = 5; our representative adult hunter￿ s life-time (two period) welfare





B(1 ￿ ￿0))g: The young, adult hunter selects CY and H to maximize








and ￿ UT￿H + ￿￿f￿UCE
￿0
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In the ￿rst equation, UCY is the marginal gain from an increment in
CY in the current period and ￿f￿UCE ￿0
5 + (1 ￿ ￿)UCE ￿
5g is the "dis-
counted" cost of this increment. In the second equation, ￿UT￿H is the
marginal cost from an increment in H in the current period (less leisure,
a lower increment in current utility) and ￿￿f￿UCE ￿0
5 + (1 ￿ ￿)UCE ￿
5g is
the "discounted" incremental gain (creating more ￿H￿CY in the second
period). In providing ￿H ￿CY for his dependents in the current period,
the young, adult hunter is hoping to be reciprocated with
￿H￿CY
￿ in the
second period. The more likely he feels that he will in fact be recipro-
cated with
￿H￿CY
￿ (the lower is risk) in the second period, the larger he
will set ￿H ￿ CY in the ￿rst period. ￿H ￿ CY can be looked upon as
(a) support provided for dependents currently and (b) a signal to the
hunter￿ s son, a child, to support the hunter in "retirement". These two







￿ is acting as the price of leisure in the ￿rst period. Since U(:) is as-
sumed to be concave and increasing in both arguments, it follows that
an increase in ￿ must decrease the ratio of the marginal utility of meat
to the marginal utility of leisure. ￿ is the e¢ ciency of hunting e⁄ort.
Hence a rise in ￿ is for the moment assumed to increase ￿rst period
utility. In addition the "budget constraint" will "rotate" as the price of
12leisure rises. There will be a tendency for T ￿ H to decline and for CY
to rise. However the ￿nal e⁄ect on (CY;H) will depend on the "income"
shift for the "budget constraint".










￿ 1; for ￿ 1 < ￿ < 1:









Observe that is ￿ is close to zero (low elasticity of substitution between
CY and T ￿ H in the utility function, then the ratio of CY and T ￿ H
will not change with a change in ￿; the e¢ ciency of hunting e⁄ort. Our
calculations indeed con￿rm this and in addition for this case of low
substitutability a small change in ￿ leaves the levels of CY and T ￿ H
unchanged. The important support allocation to dependents, namely
￿H ￿ CY rises. This support allocation rises for the case of ￿ greater
than unity as well. Hence the central result: an exogenous drift up in
￿ the e¢ ciency of hunting e⁄ort contributes to brain-size expansion, via
the route of more meat per child in the current period, as well as in the
subsequent period.
To solve the model for the case of the CES utility function, we sub-
9For the Cobb-Douglas utility function, we have U(CY ;T￿H) ￿ [CY ]￿[T￿H]1￿￿





13stitute (3) into (1) to get the following equation in H :
a ￿ [C
Y]^(￿￿) + (1 ￿ a) ￿ (T ￿ H)^(￿￿))^ex1 ￿ a ￿ C
Y^ex2
+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ((a ￿ ((￿0=5) ￿ (￿ ￿ H ￿ C
Y))^(￿￿)
+(1 ￿ a) ￿ (T ￿ ￿0^1:2)^(￿￿))^ex1 ￿ a ￿ (￿￿0=5) ￿ ((￿0=5) ￿ (￿ ￿ H ￿ C
Y))^ex2)
+(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ((a ￿ ((￿=5) ￿ (￿ ￿ H ￿ C
Y))^(￿￿)
+(1 ￿ a) ￿ (T ￿ (1 ￿ ￿0)^1:2)^(￿￿))^ex1







(T ￿ H); ex1 = (￿1 ￿ ￿)=￿; ex2 = (￿1 ￿ ￿); and
￿0 ￿ ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) = 1:
Consider some illustrative examples.
4 Improved Hunting E⁄ectiveness
First, when ￿ > 1 (elastic substitutability). For this elastic case (T =
6;a = 0:5;￿ = 0:9; ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = ￿0:39 and ￿ = 0:2; and ￿0 = 1:5
and ￿ = 0:5); we start with H = 1:8135; CY = 0:2992255 and (￿H ￿
CY) = 0:063474: We increase ￿ to 0:21 and observe that H = 1:8519;
CY = 0:32117 and (￿H ￿ CY) = 0:067730: In other "runs" with ￿ > 1;
we observed the same qualitative results: more e¢ ciency in hunting
activity (￿ increased) yielded more hunting, more meat consumption by
the hunter and more "surplus" meat for the dependents. We interpret
these results to mean that "improvements" in hunting e⁄ectiveness yields
the indirect e⁄ect of providing more meat per dependent (is pro brain-
size expansion).
The case of ￿ < 1 is slightly counter-intuitive. For the inelastic case
(￿ = 9:9; ￿ = 5:8; ￿0 = 3=2 and ￿ = 1=2) we start with H = 2:962;
CY = 3:569661 and (￿H ￿ CY) = 13:6099:
With ￿ increased to 5:9; H declines to 2:928; and CY and (￿H￿CY)
increase respectively to 3.615277 and 13.65992: For H to decline was
quite standard for this case of ￿ < 1: With ￿ "very" inelastic, H and
14CY remained almost unchanged with ￿ somewhat larger. We illustrate.
With ￿ = 25:9 and ￿ = 19:9; we obtained H = 1:1263, CY =
5:446823 and (￿H ￿ CY) = 16:9665: With ￿ increased to 19:91; H =
1:1263; CY = 5:446925 and (￿H ￿ CY) = 16:97771: The increase in
"surplus", (￿H ￿ CY); is accounted for largely by the direct impact of
the ￿ increase directly. In summary, in all cases, improved e⁄ectiveness
in hunting yielded larger alotments of meat to dependents. Put colloqui-
ally, smarter hunters provided for children better and the latter became
smarter hunters because they grew up better fed (with larger brains),
and perhaps under the tutorship of better hunters.
Becoming more e⁄ective (more intelligent?) hunters is the standard
interpretation of what occurred when early humans were "re-located" to
the savannah some two million years ago. A di⁄erent interpretation of
the impact of the climate change and switch to the open, savannah-type
living is that "warfare" between groups of proto-humans diminished in
the new environment and the life-expectancy of a representative hunter
was increased. This in our model would have induced an increase in com-
mitment on the part of a young, adult hunter to his own personal future
and at the same time to his current dependents. Recall our mechanism
of more commitment to one￿ s personal future inducing the supplying
of more surplus from hunting to the current dependents. The depen-
dents would have become better nourished and would have experienced
a brain-size increase. A brain-size increase would contribute to (a) an
increase in ￿ or hunting e⁄ectiveness and (b) to an increase in sociality
or trust (a reduction in the risk that the son will not reciprocate to the
father, in the second stage of the father￿ s life). The e⁄ect of a "sudden"
increase in life-expectancy could of course have been co-incident with an
increase in ￿, but life-expectancy increase could also have preceded the
crucial increase in hunting e⁄ectiveness.
155 Life Expectancy Increase
We change ￿ = 0:9 for our examples above to ￿ = 0:95: We start with our
benchmark case with ￿ > 1. For this elastic case (T = 6;a = 0:5;￿ = 0:9;
￿ = 0:5; ￿ = ￿0:39 and ￿ = 0:2; and ￿0 = 1:5 and ￿ = 0:5); we
start with H = 1:8135; CY = 0:2992255 and (￿H ￿ CY) = 0:063474:==
We increase ￿ to 0:95 and observe that H = 1:823; CY = 0:298547
and (￿H ￿ CY) = 0:066053: We obtain the expected result: better life
expectancy leads to more surplus for current dependents (￿H￿CY rises
from 0:063474 to 0.066053).
For the inelastic case (￿ = 9:9; ￿ = 5:8; ￿0 = 3=2 and ￿ = 1=2)
we start with H = 2:962; CY = 3:569661 and (￿H ￿ CY) = 13:6099:
With ￿ increased to 0:95; we have H = 2:973; CY = 3:55674 and (￿H ￿
CY) = 13:68666: Again surplus to dependents increases with improved
life expectancy and own consumption by the adult hunter in the ￿rst
period declines.
6 Risk Decline (More Trust of son by father)
We reduce the variance in second period allocation to the father, now a
dependent. We change ￿0 = 1:5 and ￿ = 0:5 to ￿0 = 9=8 and ￿ = 7=8:
For the elastic case (T = 6;a = 0:5;￿ = 0:9; ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = ￿0:39 and
￿ = 0:2; and ￿0 = 1:5 and ￿ = 0:5); we start with H = 1:8135; CY =
0:2992255 and (￿H ￿ CY) = 0:063474: With ￿0 = 9=8 and ￿ = 7=8 we
have H = 1:83; CY = 0:2980462 and (￿H ￿ CY) = 0:0679538: Hunting
e⁄ort increases slightly with risk reduction and own consumption by the
hunter declines slightly. The surplus going to dependents rises.
For the inelastic case (￿ = 9:9; ￿ = 5:8; ￿0 = 3=2 and ￿ = 1=2)
we start with H = 2:962; CY = 3:569661 and (￿H ￿ CY) = 13:6099:
With ￿0 = 9=8 and ￿ = 7=8 we have H = 3:993; CY = 2:35823 and
(￿H ￿ CY) = 20:801167: Own consumption by the hunter has declined
signi￿cantly while time devoted to hunting and the surplus for depen-
16dents have each increased signi￿cantly.
Each of our experiments yields anticipated results. Better hunting
e⁄ectiveness, increased own longevity and more trust each lead to a
mature, hunter providing more meat (energy) to his current dependents.
7 A Two Type Steady State Population
We now consider that adult hunters comprise NH high producers and
NL low producers. These "population" values satisfy
￿
P HH P LH



















where S is the carrying capacity of the environment that members of this
clan are living in. The P HH; P LH; etc. are probabilities with P HH = (1￿
P HL) and P HH > P HL; and P LL = (1￿ P LH) and P LL > P LH:
We now utilize these probabilities, P HH; P LH; etc. in the utility max-
imization problem carried out by each type of adult, prime-age hunter.
(P HH replaces ￿ above and P HL replaces (1 ￿ ￿):We do not have an
analogue of a "low" producing hunter above.) The utility maximization
problem for each type as a productive, adult hunter:
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17Four ￿rst order conditions give us four equations in HH;HL;CY H;
and CY L: A high alotment provider has ￿
H
0 > ￿
H and P HH > 1 ￿ P HH
and a low alotment provider has ￿
L
0 > ￿
L and P LL > 1 ￿ P LL: In














and (b) the level of a high alotment from a "high" maximizer is the same
as the level of the high alotment from "low" maximizer (and analogously

















These latter conditions imply that the recipient of an alotment is indif-
ferent as to the source of his or her alotment (whether the supplier was
a "high" supplier or a "low" supplier) but is not indi⁄erent to the size
of his or her alotment.







L: These solution values emerge at the beginning of each period
and are the same values period after period in a version of our model
which admits a non-stochastic steady state. (￿ would be now interpreted
as a non-stochastic discount factor.) Key variables here are net supplies
of meat, ￿HH ￿CY H and ￿HL ￿CY L for the current period. There are
NH "high"maximizers and NL "low" maximizers each producing ￿HH
and ￿HL respectively.
Dependents (demanders of meat) at the beginning of each period
comprise, in expected values, [P HHNH + P LHNL]￿ expecting a high
alotment, ￿
H
0 [￿HH￿CY H]=￿ (equal to ￿
L
0[￿HL￿CY L]=￿) and [P HLNH+
P LLNL]￿ expecting a low alotment, ￿
H[￿HH￿CY H]=￿ (equal to ￿
L[￿HL￿
18CY L]=￿). Our rational expectations formulation guarantees in expecta-
tion, that the "surplus" supplies of meat in the aggregate at the be-
ginning of each period, namely, [￿HH ￿ CY H]NH + [￿HL ￿ CY L]NL
equal demands, also in the aggregate, namely, [P HHNH + P LHNL]￿ ￿
￿
H
0 [￿HH ￿CY H]=￿ +[P HLNH +P LLNL]￿ ￿￿
H[￿HH ￿CY H]=￿: Hence
we have an economy-wide equilibrium, in the limited sense of matching
quantities supplied and demanded in expectations.10 Also our "popula-
tion" size for our community is a function of the carrying capacity of the
environment.
If we take the randomness in "second period outcomes" at face value
at each date, we will have a complicated situation in which our NH and
NL move stochastically and at each date quantities supplied must be
adjusted to match quantities demanded. In addition we will have to
determine the nature of the limiting distributions of our NH and NL;
as random variables. We leave the investigation of the fully stochastic
version of our model for another occasion.
Here the nutrition status (carrying capacity of the local environment)
implicitly a⁄ects the number of dynasties NH and NL rather than af-
fecting current family size. At each stage we have a hunter providing
for a ￿xed number of dependents with some hunters providing "high"
alotments and some "low" alotments.
8 Concluding Remark
We have presented a theory of food-sharing by male, adult hunters based
entirely on non-altruistic behavior. Hunters provide meat to their depen-
dents, including their child-sons, in order to (a) have the sons grow up to
be good hunters and providers and (b) to encourage the sons to provide
10The Robson-Kaplan model is also solved in expectations. Central to their model
is the life expectancy function. Outcomes of their model should have each individual
with a distinct realized life duration. This would of course make their model a very
complicated stochastic process. They detour around this problem by taking each
person￿ s life expectancy as an expected value.
19meat to their dependents, including their now-retired father. Fathers,
as good adult hunters, look forward to their years of "retirement" and
make provision for their future welfare by encouraging their child-sons
to provide for them, as retired adults. The "encouragement" takes the
form of the fathers setting an example to the sons, while the sons are
young. Given this theory, we indicate how brain-size expansion could
have taken place. We perturb key parameters and indicate how fathers,
as mature hunters, respond by providing more generously to their de-
pendents. Some novel scenarios for brain-size expansion emerge here.
When dependents are better provided for, we infer that they can experi-
ence "pressure" for brain-size expansion. Our approach places emphasis
on hominid fathers as calculating planners. They are not hard-wired
to provide for their dependents instinctively as in responding to genetic
triggers. Rather they reason that provision for dependents is a strategy
for lengthening their own lives because the providing for of dependents
constitutes a signal to child-sons to provide for their dependents, includ-
ing their aged parents, when they the children have become good, adult
hunters. We have included some quid pro quo by aged fathers. Though
the fathers in "retirement" do not hunt, they do provide child care and
instruction to children and thus in part "earn their keep".
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